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Abstract—A pay-TV consumer uses a decoder to access
encrypted digital content. To this end, the decoder contains
a chip capable of decrypting the content if provisioned with
the appropriate content decryption keys. A key establishment
protocol is used to secure the delivery of the content decryption
keys to the chip. This paper presents a new protocol and shows
how the protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system. Compared
to existing protocols, the presented solution reduces the risk that
decoders need to be replaced in order to correct a security breach.
The new protocol has recently been incorporated in an ETSI
standard.
Index Terms—Content protection, Conditional access, Pay-TV,
Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a pay-TV system, the pay-TV provider’s head-end system
encrypts the content before broadcasting it, and a consumer
uses a decoder capable of decrypting the content to access it. In
order to achieve this, a decoder contains a chip that implements
the content decryption algorithm; this chip is also referred to
as the content decryption chip in this paper. Examples of a
decoder are a set-top box or a PC Card in case of a Common
Interface (CI) or CI+ module.
A pay-TV provider uses a Conditional Access (CA) system
to control access to the content, thereby ensuring that only
authorized decoders have access to the keys required to decrypt
the content. In particular, each decoder associated with the
pay-TV provider contains a CA client, and only the CA client
of an authorized decoder will pass content decryption keys,
referred to as control words in a pay-TV system, to the content
decryption chip in the decoder.
Attacks in which an adversary compromises and re-
distributes control words are a threat to the security of a
pay-TV system, as this enables non-authorized access to the
corresponding content. It is generally easy for an adversary
to read or modify messages passed from the CA client to the
content decryption chip in a decoder, or to inject messages
into this channel. For these reasons, a cryptographic protocol
is used to transport control words from the CA client to the
content decryption chip.
This paper presents a new key establishment protocol. The
new protocol offers a similar level of security as existing
protocols (see e.g. [1]) against attacks in which content de-
cryption keys are compromised and re-distributed. The main
advantage of the new protocol is that it achieves the unique and
desirable property of being able to restore security for future
protocol executions without the need to replace any decoder
in the event that all system components other than the content
decryption chips have been compromised. By comparison,
existing protocols necessitate the replacement of the entire
decoder population in this scenario. The new protocol was
recently incorporated in a new ETSI standard [2].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic Concepts of a Pay-TV System
This section describes aspects of a pay-TV system that are
relevant to this paper. This paper assumes that the pay-TV
system is compliant with the widely adopted Digital Video
Broadcasting (DVB) standard (see also www.dvb.org).
Fig. 1 depicts the basic components of a DVB pay-TV
system. The pay-TV provider operates a head-end system and
a consumer uses a decoder to access content broadcast by the
provider. Note that only one decoder is depicted in Fig. 1;
in practice a large number of decoders are associated with
the head-end system. To protect content, denoted by C in
Fig. 1, it is encrypted inside the head-end system before it is
broadcast. To this end, DVB defines a symmetric encryption
scheme referred to as the Common Scrambling Algorithm
(CSA) [3]. A CSA key is referred to as a control word and
denoted by K in Fig. 1. Throughout the paper, the key of
a keyed cryptographic algorithm is written as a subscript;
for example, the encryption of C using the CSA encryption
algorithm and control word K is denoted by CSAK(C). The
corresponding decryption algorithm CSA−1 is implemented
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Fig. 1. DVB pay-TV system.
inside the content decryption chip integrated in the decoder.
Typically, a control word is updated every 5 to 10 seconds.
A CA system ensures that only authorized decoders can ac-
cess content. As shown in Fig. 1, the CA system comprises CA
components at the head-end and a CA client in each decoder.
The DVB standard does not specify the CA system itself.
Consequently, a number of different CA system suppliers exist,
each offering their own proprietary CA system. However, DVB
has defined a head-end system architecture, referred to as the
DVB SimulCrypt standard [4] [5]. This standard identifies the
logical components in the head-end system and it specifies
the interfaces between these components. In particular, in the
SimulCrypt standard the head-end system implements the CSA
encryption algorithm and a Random Number Generator (RNG)
to generate control words, which are supplied as input to
CSA and to the CA components at the head-end (see also
Fig. 1). An important property of SimulCrypt is that this
architecture enables the use of multiple CA systems in the
head-end system, each protecting the same encrypted content
(in Fig. 1 only one CA system is depicted). Such systems are
referred to as interoperating CA systems.
Further, DVB defines two types of CA message that can be
sent from the CA components to a CA client [3]. The first type
is an Entitlement Management Message (EMM); an EMM is
typically used to authorize a decoder to access a specific piece
of content. The second type is an Entitlement Control Message
(ECM); ECMs are used to distribute control words to the CA
clients of authorized decoders. The contents of EMMs and
ECMs are proprietary to the CA system.
The CA components at the head-end generate the CA
messages before broadcasting the encrypted content and the
CA messages to the decoders. An important property for the
protocol described in this paper is that an electronic return
channel from a decoder to the head-end system may not be
available in a pay-TV system, in particular if a satellite or
terrestrial network is used for broadcasting information to the
decoders. This paper therefore assumes that such a return
channel is not available.
There is usually a limited amount of bandwidth available
for sending CA messages in a pay-TV system, as a pay-TV
provider prefers to use as much of the available bandwidth
as possible for broadcasting content. In particular, it is not
possible to distribute a uniquely encrypted message to every
CA client for every control word K . To address this, the CA
system can protect a number of control words using a key that
is shared between all the CA clients of authorized decoders.
The CA client in a decoder processes EMMs and ECMs.
If the decoder is authorized to access content associated with
a specific ECM, that is, if the CA client in the decoder has
received and processed an EMM authorizing the decoder to
access this content, then the CA client derives the control word
from the ECM. Next, the CA client passes the control word
to the content decryption chip in the decoder. It is generally
possible to update the CA client in a decoder. In particular, this
enables the pay-TV provider to correct any security breach of
the CA clients without replacing any decoder.
B. Control Word Re-distribution Attacks
In a control word re-distribution attack an adversary first
compromises control words, e.g. by extracting control words
from an authorized decoder. Next, the adversary re-distributes
the control words to pirate decoders that have access to
the pay-TV provider’s broadcast. A pirate decoder then uses
the encrypted content in the broadcast and the re-distributed
control words as inputs to its implementation of CSA−1 to
illegally access content in real-time.
The content decryption algorithm CSA−1 may only be
implemented after obtaining a license from ETSI. This makes
it possible to suppress illegal implementations. Furthermore,
CSA is a DVB-confidential cipher and CSA v3 contains an
emulation resistant algorithm (see also [3]). These measures
make it difficult for an adversary to use pirate decoders
containing illegal implementations of CSA−1 in a control word
re-distribution attack. However, it is generally easy to access
the channel from the CA client to the content decryption chip
in a decoder containing a legitimate implementation of CSA−1
(see also Fig. 1). In particular, if this channel is unprotected,
then an adversary may compromise control words when they
are passed from the CA client to the chip, or the adversary may
inject compromised control words into this channel, using the
decoder as a pirate decoder. In practice, the channel from the
CA client to the content decryption chip is therefore protected
using a cryptographic protocol. Such a protocol should provide
implicit key authentication so that only the content decryption
chips of authorized decoders have access to the control word.
As explained later in Section IV, this measure is also useful
for identifying compromised chips that are used as source
devices in a control word re-distribution attack. In addition, the
protocol should prevent the adversary from finding protocol
messages that enable the content decryption chip of a non-
authorized decoder that is compliant with the protocol to derive
a compromised control word. This is referred to as protecting
the authenticity of protocol messages and this measure makes
it difficult for an adversary to use a compliant chip containing a
legitimate CSA−1 implementation as a sink device in a control
word re-distribution attack in the case that the values of the
control words are known.
III. THE NEW KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL
A. Description of the Protocol
This section presents the new key establishment protocol,
and the next section shows how the protocol can be applied
in a pay-TV system. The protocol takes into account that
there is generally no trust relation between pay-TV providers,
and that there is a limited amount of bandwidth available for
sending CA messages. The setting in this paper is that multiple
receivers are associated with one sender. The protocol enables
the sender and a number of receivers selected by the sender to
derive a shared secret K . A receiver selected by the sender is
referred to as an authorized receiver in the following text. The
protocol provides implicit key authentication; in other words,
the sender is assured that only authorized receivers have access
to K . In addition, the protocol protects the authenticity of
protocol messages in that it is computationally infeasible for
an adversary to find protocol messages that enable a non-
authorized receiver that is compliant with the protocol to
derive a given K (as generated by the sender).
The new protocol is described in Protocol 1, and the
parties and their protocol steps are depicted in Fig. 2 (with
the exception of Step 4). The protocol uses a public-key
encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. The public-
key encryption and decryption algorithms are denoted by E
and D, respectively. Further, the signature generation algo-
rithm and the signature verification algorithm are denoted
by S and V . For ease of notation, a signature scheme with
message recovery is used in the description of the protocol.
Instead, a signature scheme with partial message recovery or
a signature scheme with appendix can be used. The identity
of receiver B is denoted by B in signed messages, and
in Fig. 2, KPG denotes a key pair generator that generates
key pairs associated with the signature scheme. The protocol
also uses a symmetric encryption scheme and a cryptographic
hash function h. The corresponding encryption and decryption
algorithms are denoted by e and d, respectively. Further, it is
assumed that the bit-length of the output of h equals the bit-
length ofK . A truncation method may be applied to the output
of a well-known hash function (e.g. SHA-512) in order to
define a suitable h. A trusted third party acts as a certification
authority in the protocol. The following description therefore
assumes that the trusted third party has generated a key pair
associated with the signature scheme. The private key and the
public key in this pair are denoted by SKT and PKT .
Protocol 1.
Initialization: each receiver generates a key pair associated
with the public-key encryption scheme. The private key and
the public key in the key pair of receiver B are denoted by
SKB and PKB , respectively. Initialize B with SKB, and
securely transfer PKB to trusted third party T .
I. Establish long-term key:
1) A generates a key pair associated with the signature
scheme. The private key and the public key in this pair
are denoted by SKA and PKA, respectively.
2) For each receiver B associated with A:
a) A generates a symmetric long-term key LKB.
b) A computes EPKB (LKB) (it is assumed that A
has received PKB from T ; PKB is stored in a
database in Fig. 2).
c) A computes the signature
SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)).
d) A sends to B the values PKA and
SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)).
e) B computes VPKA(SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB))).
If the signature is valid, then B recovers
(B,EPKB (LKB)) from the signature, and
verifies if B is the intended recipient. B aborts
the protocol if any check fails.
f) B computes LKB = DSKB(EPKB (LKB)).
II. Establish shared secret:
3) A generates a secret random number r with a bit-length
that is equal to, or slightly larger than, the bit-length of
K .
4) A represents PKA and r by fixed-length bit strings,
concatenates these bit strings to obtain r||PKA and
computes K = h(r||PKA).
5) For each authorized receiver B:
a) A computes eLKB(r).
b) A sends to B the value eLKB(r).
c) B computes r = dLKB (eLKB(r)).
d) B computes the shared secret K = h(r||PKA)
(the concatenation is not depicted in Fig. 2).
The initialization phase is a one-time setup of the protocol.
Observe that the distribution of PKB from T to A is not de-
scribed in Protocol 1. In practice, T can first securely transfer
PKT to A. Next, T can create the certificate SSKT (B,PKB)
and send this certificate to A. T can also manage the re-
vocation of such certificates. Based on this information, A
can create a database containing public keys of non-revoked
certificates (as depicted in Fig. 2).
The remainder of the protocol is divided into two similar
phases: in Phase I the sender transports a long-term key to each
receiver, and in Phase II the sender transports a shared secret
to each authorized receiver. In practice, Phase II is executed
a number of times after Phase I is executed, and the sender
can select any set of authorized receivers for every execution
of Phase II. The protocol description assumes that there is
only one sender; however, in practice multiple senders can
independently execute the protocol with receiver B based on
the same initialization value SKB.
B. Security Analysis
For ease of exposition, the channels between a receiver and
the trusted third party (as used during the initialization of the
protocol) and between a sender and the trusted third party are
assumed to be secure. The remainder of this section assumes
that B′ is a receiver that is: (1) compliant with Protocol 1,
(2) non-authorized in the execution of Phase II in which K is
generated and (3) authorized in all other executions of Phase
II. Further, it is assumed that all other receivers are authorized
in all executions of Phase II. These assumptions ensure that
B′ and the adversary have as much information as possible in
the discussions below.
To show that only authorized receivers have access to the
shared secret K , it is assumed that the following information
is available to B′ (in addition to publicly known information):
(1) the values of all secret random numbers except r (implying
that B′ also has access to all the corresponding shared secrets),
(2) the value of SKB′ , and (3) all values of LKB′ . Note that
the random number r corresponds to exactly one execution
of Phase I. The ciphertexts, random numbers, shared secrets
and values of LKB′ which are available to B
′ and which
are associated with other executions of Phase I (and possibly
with other senders) do not make it easier for B′ to find r
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Fig. 2. The new key establishment protocol.
since anyone can easily generate link keys, random numbers,
shared secrets, and ciphertexts that are indistinguishable from
the ones generated by the legitimate senders based on publicly
known information. This means that the problem of finding
r is equivalent to finding r from the available data that
are associated with the particular execution of Phase I as
mentioned above and the corresponding executions of Phase
II. From the observations that the private keys SKB and
the long-term keys LKB are generated independently and at
random for each receiver B and that a fresh random number
is generated at random in every execution of Phase II, and
under the assumption that the encryption algorithms do not
leak information about their key and message inputs, it follows
that B′ has no access to the random number r. From this, and
under the assumption that h behaves as a random function, it
follows that B′ does not have access to the shared secret K .
With respect to the protection of the authenticity of pro-
tocol messages, suppose that an adversary manages to find
three protocol messages m1, m2 and m3 that enable a non-
authorized receiver B′ that is compliant with Protocol 1 to
derive a given shared secret K (as generated by A). The inputs
to V and d (see also Fig. 2) are referred to as m2 and m3
respectively, and the third message is referred to as m1. The
following discussion assumes that the adversary has access to
the values of all secret random numbers (and, consequently,
to all the shared secrets). Under the assumption that h is
second preimage resistant, the input to h must be r||PKA.
This implies that m1 = PKA. The adversary now needs to
find m2 and m3 such that the input to D equals EPK
B′
(LK)
for some LK and such that dLK(m3) = r. Furthermore, m2
needs to be accepted by the signature verification algorithm
using PKA as input. Under the assumption that the signature
scheme is secure against signature forgery attacks, the only
option for the adversary is to use the protocol message
SSKA(B
′, EPK
B′
(LKB′)) as generated by A in Step 2c
and distributed to B′ in Step 2d in the execution of Phase
I associated with (SKA, PKA) as m2. This implies that
m3 = eLK
B′
(r). A similar reasoning as that for r in the
previous paragraph can be applied to show that the problem
of finding m3 is equivalent to finding m3 from the available
data that are associated with this execution of Phase I and
the corresponding executions of Phase II. If one or more
ciphertexts were distributed to B′ in these executions of Phase
II, then let these ciphertexts be denoted by eLK
B′
(ri) for
1 ≤ i ≤ m with m ≥ 1. Since the keys SKB, LKB
and the shared secrets are all generated independently and
at random, and under the assumptions that the encryption
algorithms do not leak information about LKB′ , it follows
that for all practical values of m the only useful information
for the adversary is that m3 6= eLK
B′
(ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If
no ciphertexts were distributed to B′ in these executions, then
no useful information is available to the adversary. From this
it follows that the adversary is not able to find m3.
Multiple senders can execute the new protocol indepen-
dently with B based on the same initialization value SKB
and without requiring a trust relation between senders since
a compromise of all keys of a sender does not affect the
operations of other senders. In particular, observe that the
new protocol prevents that sender A′ can generate protocol
messages that enable a receiver that is compliant with the
protocol to derive a given shared secret K (as generated by
A) since the hash function h binds the shared secret K to
a specific key pair (SKA, PKA). The binding also enables
A to revoke a key pair (SKA, PKA) and all corresponding
long-term keys LKB .
If an adversary compromises the system of a sender or the
system of the trusted third party (i.e. compromising all secrets
of such a system), then one or both security properties of
the protocol may no longer be satisfied. An important aspect
of the protocol when applied in a pay-TV system is whether
security be restored for future protocol executions based on the
same initialization values. The main difference with existing
protocols that offer implicit key authentication and protection
of the authenticity of protocol messages is that the trusted
third party does not manage any secret associated with a
value that was used to initialize B in the new protocol. This
results in the unique property of enabling the restoration of
security for future protocol executions (based on SKB) even
in the event that the system of the trusted third party and
the systems of the senders have been compromised, in other
words, if SKT and all keys of the senders’ systems have
been compromised. To see this, observe that a compromise of
SKT invalidates the certificate of B (i.e. SSKT (B,PKB)),
but not the key pair (SKB, PKB) or certificate revocation
information. The trusted third party and the senders can first
restore the security of their systems to correct the security
breach. Next, the trusted third party can update their key pair
(SKT , PKT ). After this, the trusted third party can securely
transfer the public key of this updated key pair to the senders,
and re-issue certificates using the private key of the updated
pair. Finally, senders can set up their system as if they were
new senders joining the system, using the re-issued certificates
and newly generated keys and shared secrets in their future
protocol executions. From the discussions above it follows that
both security properties are restored for these executions.
IV. APPLICATION IN PAY-TV SYSTEMS
In a pay-TV system, sender A comprises a CA system and
components in the head-end system that are shared between
interoperating CA systems. Further, receiver B is a content
decryption chip in a decoder associated with A, and K is
a control word. Fig. 3 depicts an example of how the new
protocol can be applied in a pay-TV system. As in DVB Simul-
Crypt, the example keeps the number of secret and private
keys used outside the CA components in the head-end system
as small as possible, while still facilitating interoperability.
The following text describes which of the protocol steps are
performed by the CA components at the head-end and the CA
clients in the decoders, respectively. The communications from
the CA components to the CA clients are also described in this
section. Note that these aspects are not described in Protocol 1,
as the CA components and the CA clients are both part of
the sender in Protocol 1. In particular, the communications
from the sender to the receiver as shown in Fig. 2 are the
communications from the CA client to the chip in Fig. 3.
As shown in Fig. 3, the random number generator and the
hash function h are the shared components; these components
perform Steps 3 and 4 of the protocol. As the public key
PKA is input to h, the CA components output this value after
generating the corresponding key pair in Step 1. The public
key PKA is also distributed from the CA components to the
CA clients, as it needs to be distributed to the chips in Step 2d.
An EMM can be used to distribute this value to all the CA
clients. Recall that PKA does not need to be protected during
its distribution to the chips. In particular, no certificates or
certificate revocation information need to be distributed to a
decoder in the application of the new protocol.
The signature SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)) is generated
uniquely for chip B in Step 2c. However, these values are
only generated during the execution of Phase I, and not every
5 to 10 seconds in case of eLKB(K) in Phase II. This makes it
feasible to distribute the values SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)) from
the head-end system to the CA clients. The CA components
at the head-end can therefore perform Steps 2a – 2c. Next,
the value SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)) is distributed to the CA
client associated with B, along with a copy of LKB to enable
the CA client to perform Step 5a. This distribution can be
done using an EMM. After receiving the EMM, the CA client
passes the value SSKA(B,EPKB (LKB)) to B in Step 2d.
The random number r is input to the CA components at
the head-end instead of the shared secret K in Fig. 1. Next,
the CA components include r in an ECM instead of K and
distribute the ECM to the CA clients. The confidentiality and
authenticity of r can be protected with the same methods as
used for protecting the confidentiality and authenticity of K in
a legacy CA system. After receiving the ECM, the CA clients
of authorized decoders derive r from the ECM. Next, the CA
client associated with chip B performs Step 5a and passes the
value eLKB(r) to B in Step 5b.
If CA systems interoperate at the head-end, then each of
these CA systems is associated with a sender as defined in
Section III-A. Each sender executes the new protocol indepen-
dently with their decoders, with the exception of Steps 3 and
4; these steps are shared between all the interoperating senders
and performed by the shared components at the head-end. The
random number is provided as input to the CA components
of each of the interoperating CA systems. The input to h can
be easily generalized so that it can contain all the public keys
as output by the CA components, and a chip can accept a
message that is signed with any of the corresponding private
keys. Observe that this implies that the chip in a decoder also
needs access to all these public keys. To achieve this, the
public key of each CA system can be provided as input to
the CA components of all other interoperating CA systems,
which can then distribute the public keys to their decoders.
Recall from Section III-A that multiple senders can execute
the new protocol independently with any receiver without
requiring a trust relation between senders. If the protocol is
applied in a pay-TV system and if the CA systems associated
with senders A and A′ interoperate at the head-end, then A
and A′ do not execute the protocol independently with their
receivers. In particular, A and A′ share the secret K , implying
that a trust relation is required between interoperating senders.
However, observe that such senders are always part of the
same head-end system. As a head-end system is assumed to
be operated by a single pay-TV provider, any pay-TV provider
can use a compliant decoder in their operation without the need
to trust any other pay-TV provider.
As the protocol provides implicit key authentication, a con-
sumer with a non-authorized decoder cannot obtain illegal ac-
cess to content by compromising all secrets of their decoder’s
chip. Additionally, the re-distribution of a compromised K to
non-authorized and non-compromised chips that are compliant
with the protocol is prevented since the authenticity of protocol
messages is protected. From the discussion in Section III-B it
follows that both these properties can be restored for future
protocol executions without replacing any decoder in the
event that the system of the trusted third party, the head-end
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Fig. 3. Application in a pay-TV system.
systems and the CA clients have been compromised. This is a
significant advantage over all of the existing protocols, which
necessitate the replacement of the entire decoder population
in this scenario. The reason for this is that existing protocols
require the trusted third party (or the sender) to manage a
secret associated with a value that was used to initialize B.
This secret is a key of a symmetric-key scheme or a private
key of a digital signature scheme; in other words, the chip
is initialized with a symmetric key or with a public key of a
digital signature scheme in existing protocols. A compromise
of the secret managed by the trusted third party cannot be
corrected without replacing the corresponding decoder, as this
is the only way to update an initialization value of B.
If the adversary compromises the chip of a decoder (i.e.
compromising all its secrets), then the adversary can use
the compromised chip as a source device in a control word
re-distribution attack for protocol executions in which the
decoder is authorized. Chips acting as source devices may
be identified using a traitor tracing scheme (see e.g. [6])
and identified chips may be revoked to restore security for
future protocol executions. Implicit key authentication is a
useful property for the application of traitor tracing schemes as
defined in [6] since it ensures that a compromised chip cannot
be used to re-distribute control words of protocol executions
in which the corresponding decoder was non-authorized. The
new protocol has the property that an adversary cannot find the
value of a control word if the secrets of any number of non-
authorized chips are compromised. This is a useful property
for identifying compromised chips in the case of a collusion
attack. The adversary may also use a compromised chip as a
sink device in a control word re-distribution attack. In practice,
it may be hard to impossible to identify such a chip. However,
for the new protocol a per-chip attack is required in order to be
able to use chips as sink devices in such an attack, mitigating
this threat from a practical point of view.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Section III-A presented a new key establishment protocol
and Section IV described how this protocol can be applied in
a pay-TV system. The main innovation of the new protocol is
the combination of a cryptographic hash function and a public-
key encryption scheme. As shown, this results in a protocol in
which the authenticity of protocol messages is protected and
in which the trusted third party only needs to manage a public
key of each receiver. As a consequence, the protocol achieves
the unique property of enabling the restoration of security for
future protocol executions in the event that the system of the
trusted third party and the systems of the senders have been
compromised. If applied in a pay-TV system, the new protocol
reduces the risk that decoders need to be replaced to correct
a security breach.
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